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ABSTRACT
This article provides a thorough critique of the Supreme Court decision of Castle Rock v. Gonzales 125 S.
Ct. 2796 (2005) which dismissed respondent’s case for failing to establish that she had a property right in
the enforcement of a restraining order that was worthy of procedural due process protection. The article
critiques the Court’s methodology and substantive arguments. The article concludes by situating the
decision in “Lochner’s legacy,” a legacy of decisions that Cass Sunstein has identified as privileging
“government inaction,” and “the existing distribution of entitlements” as set by the common law. Just as
the Lochner Court decided that it was for it to determine the meaning of “liberty” when it struck down a
New York statute designed to limit the hours of bakers for their health, the Court in Castle Rock has
decided it is for it to determine the meaning of “property,” by rewriting a statute designed to make
enforcement of restraining orders mandatory for the safety of those granted orders. Just as the Lochner
Court chose the liberty of employers over the health of workers, the Court in Castle Rock has chosen the
liberty of police officers over the safety of victims of domestic violence.
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“Their response, in other words, was a sham which rendered her property interest in the
restraining order not only a nullity, but a cruel deception.”
Justice Seymour, Circuit Court at 1117

I.

INTRODUCTION

Section I of the majority opinion in Castle Rock v. Gonzales1 starts with the following statement:
The horrible facts of this case are contained in the complaint that respondent Jessica
Gonzales filed in Federal District Court… Respondent alleges that petitioner… violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
when its police officers, acting pursuant to official policy or custom, failed to respond
properly to her repeated reports that her estranged husband was violating the terms of a
restraining order.2
Subsequently, her estranged husband killed their three daughters and drove with their bodies in
the cab of his pickup truck to the police station where he open fired on the police who returned
fire, killing him.3 Sadly, incidents such as these are not uncommon.
In 1994 Colorado joined a wave of states that enacted legislation to address this very
problem:4 the problem of death and injury to victims of domestic violence caused in part by the
custom of police to avoid the enforcement of restraining orders.5 The Colorado General
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125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
Id. at 2800.
3
Id. at 2802.
4
Justice Stevens notes that nineteen states mandate arrest for domestic restraining order violations. Castle Rock,
125 S. Ct. at 2818 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Arthur L. Rizer III puts the number of states that have enacted
mandatory arrest statutes for violating protection orders at twenty-four. Arthur L. Rizer III, Mandatory Arrest: Do
We Need to Take a Closer Look, 36 UWLA L. REV. 1, 9 (2005). Ned Millerin, Domestic Violence: A Review of
State Legislation Defining Police and Prosecution Duties and Powers, INST. L. & JUST. 31 (2004) (inclusive of
legislation up to 2003) puts the number at thirty-one. There are currently thirty-five states and territories that
mandate enforcement, and thirteen states that make enforcement discretionary. See Appendix A, Table of
legislation pertaining to arrests for the violation of restraining orders or protection orders. Five states do not have
clear legislation on the issue. See id.
5
One of the most important factors leading to the development of mandatory arrest laws has been the consistent
dismissive attitude that police have displayed toward domestic violence. Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A
Step Toward Eradication of Domestic Violence But is it Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 542 (1996). Almost
every state now allows police officers to make an arrest without a warrant when the officer has probable cause to
believe that domestic violence has occurred. Id. at 542. "However, police officers have made little use of their
2
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Assembly passed legislation targeting domestic violence in general,6 and the mandatory
enforcement of restraining orders in particular. Section 18-6-803.5. of the Colorado Revised
Statutes Annotated (“Crime of violation of a protection order--penalty--peace officers' duties”)
states, “... A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order,”7 and
further clarifies the duty by stating:
A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances,
seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has
information amounting to probable cause that:
(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a
protection order; and
(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of the protection order or
the restrained person has received actual notice of the existence and substance of such
order.8
The statute not only identifies the police as having a duty to enforce the protection order
but also identifies the beneficiary of the order. Subsection (1)(a) identifies the “protected
person” as “…the person or persons identified in the protection order as the person or persons for
whose benefit the protection order was issued.”
In effect, the Colorado General Assembly forged a “special relationship” between the
police and those who have obtained restraining orders, creating duties on the police to enforce
restraining orders, and the right or entitlement of those who have obtained orders to have them
enforced. This altered the common law distribution of entitlements and duties, for under the
expanded arrest power ... even when probable cause is clearly present, police officers frequently try to calm the
parties and act as mediators." Id. Further, Wanless refers to three studies that have shown that arrest records are
very poor when there are no policies or laws mandating arrest. Id. These studies found that when the decision was
left to the police the arrest rate ranged between three percent and ten percent. Id. In one of the studies police made
arrests in only thirteen percent of the cases where the victim had visible injuries and in only fourteen percent of the
cases where the victim requested an arrest. Id. at 542-43. Another study put the latter figure at thirty-nine percent.
Id. at 543. The more fundamental reason for the laws is the tragic numbers of deaths and injuries to women and
children (see, e.g., The American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence statistics on women and
children, at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2005)) which were due in part to the
ineffectiveness of prior forms of intervention and to the dismissive attitudes of the police. Wanless, supra, at 54042.
6
See Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (LEXIS through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)).
8
Id. at § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (emphasis added).
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common law, the State does not have a duty to come to one’s aid and one does not have a right
for the State to come to her or his assistance to protect her or him from harm caused by other
people.9 Under the common law, the police have no duty to come to one’s aid unless there is this
“special relationship.”10 The rule is that the police owe a general duty to everybody, and with a
few exceptions, they owe it to nobody.11 As paradoxical as this sounds, the public duty rule
works to defeat claims by specific individuals absent a “special relationship” establishing a
specific duty to the plaintiff or her class.12 Traditionally, “special relationships” are limited to
those cases in which the police have committed to taking action on behalf of the particular
plaintiff,13 or those in her class.14 One way of overcoming the general duty doctrine and creating
a special relationship is through a statute that imposes a special duty on the entity for a particular
class of persons.15

9

The Supreme Court made this clear in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189 (1989), except in the narrow case where the State has created the danger. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 37 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
10
See, e.g., Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure
to Provide Police Protection from Crime, 90 A.L.R. 5th 273 (2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A,
323 (1965).
11
See Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862 (N.Y. 1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
12
The public duty doctrine extends beyond police duties to all public entities. Exceptions can be found when the
conduct in question is not merely negligent but reckless, intentional or egregious, or when the entity induces reliance
by the plaintiff, stands in a special relationship to either the wrongdoer or the victim, and when the entity is guilty of
a misfeasance (negligent action), rather than a nonfeasance (negligent omission). See D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 271 pp. 723-27 (2000). Dobbs refers to recent case law in a few states that have rejected the public duty
doctrine, including Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon,
and Wisconsin. Id. at 725-26 n.23. In many of these cases the courts noted that the public duty rule was a form of
immunity and thus should not survive when immunity has been abrogated. Id.
13
“…[W]hen the State, through its agents, voluntarily assumes a protective duty toward a particular member of the
public, and undertakes action on behalf of that individual, reliance is induced and the State is held to the same
standard of care as a private person or organization.” Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 24 (Cal.) (1983). See, e.g.,
Morgan v. County of Yuba, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (where police failed to keep their voluntary
promise to inform plaintiff’s wife of the release of a prisoner who had threatened to kill her and when released did
kill her). The rule has been characterized as an application of the “good Samaritan” rule that attaches once one
volunteers to assist. See Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 208 (Cal. 1982). Note, however, that the
argument for holding the police liable under such conditions is stronger given that they have a general duty to the
public while the average citizen who volunteers aid does not.
14
Florence v. Goldberg, 375 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1978) (the police department voluntarily assumed the specific duty
to guard a school crossing and without notice failed in that duty).
15
Dobbs, supra note 12 at 724. Dobbs also refers to statutes creating a duty to investigate and report child abuse.
See id.
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This is what the Colorado legislation did. The point was to take away the discretion of
the police to either enforce or to ignore the court orders and to make the order worth something
more than just a sham or “a cruel deception.”16 The legislation and the court order were
designed to make it clear to the police that in addition to their general public duties that they
have specific duties to a certain class of individuals covered by the legislation and to the
particular person specified in the court order. The idea was to forge a special relationship with a
class of people that the police had wanted to avoid.17 Thus at last, those who had obtained
restraining orders could count on being protected and an era of arbitrary enforcement was to
come to an end.
Yet last term, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially rewrote the Colorado law and undid its
protections by removing any prospect for a constitutional remedy for those directly harmed by
police officers’ arbitrary decision to violate the law by not enforcing restraining orders.
Ms. Gonzales sued under 24 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process clause, arguing that the City of Castle Rock and its police department not be allowed
to arbitrarily deprive her of the rights the legislation gave to people in her class and to her

16

Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1104. The circuit court made the following remark about the conduct of the police in this
case: “Their response, in other words, was a sham which rendered her property interest in the restraining order not
only a nullity, but a cruel deception.” Id. at 1117. As noted by the circuit court, the property right held by this
particular plaintiff was not created by the abstract legislative process which brought the legislation into being, but by
the order “issued by a court on behalf of a particular person and directed at specific individuals and the police.” Id.
at 1104.
17
As Heather Melton states, “Historically, police response has been severely limited and confined to a policy under
which officers ended up chronically distancing themselves from a task they felt did not belong under their
jurisdiction.” Heather C. Melton, Police Response to Domestic Violence, 29 JOURNAL OF OFFENDER
REHABILITATION 1, 1 (1999), available at
http://www.crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/CJreadings/PoliceDomesticViolence.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2005). The
reasons for the avoidance include sexist views, the view that these are purely private matters, the resistance the
police encounter from perpetrators and victims, the danger for the police responding to domestic calls, and the fact
that the police they are often ill- equipped to mediate or counsel perpetrators and victims. See, e.g. Melton, supra, at
3. An influential study in Minneapolis indicated that arrests were more effective at addressing the problem. Melton,
supra, at 2. Marion Wanless argues that mandatory arrest statutes aid the police as they take the domestic violence
scenario out of the quasi police function of mediation and put it squarely into the arrest function, which police are
better trained to perform and more comfortable performing. Wanless, supra note 5, at 547.
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personally, namely, the right to the enforcement of a restraining order when both the legislation
and the court order state that enforcement is mandatory.18 In other words, this case was not
about whether the police were required to either arrest or obtain an arrest warrant for Ms.
Gonzalez’s estranged husband, much less about whether they had a duty to protect her children
from the fatal harm that they suffered at his hands.19 Her claim was that “…she had a property
interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband; and that the town
deprived her of this property without due process by having a policy that tolerated
nonenforcement of restraining orders.” 20
The alleged facts, which, given the posture of the case, were required to be accepted as
true by the Court, were that “her deprivation was not the result of random and unauthorized
behavior by the individual officers. Rather, . . . the deprivation was the result of a custom and
policy of the City of Castle Rock not to enforce domestic abuse protective orders.”21 Ms.
Gonzales alleged that "the City of Castle Rock, through its police department, has created an
official policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of restraining order
violations" and "the City's police department maintains an official policy or custom that
recklessly disregards a person's rights to police protection with respect to protective orders, and
provides for or tolerates the non-enforcement of protective orders by its police officers..."22
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, ruled that Ms. Gonzales could not
state a claim for which relief could be granted, because she had no “property right” to have the
18

As the Court explained, “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a State shall
not ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ Amdt. 14, § 1. In 42 U.S.C. §
1983, Congress has created a federal cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws.’" Id. at 2802-03.
19
As the circuit court noted, “Indeed, the process would only take minutes to perform, and includes tasks officers
regularly perform in the course of their daily duties.” Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1116 (10th Cir.
2004).
20
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803.
21
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1112-13.
22
Id. at 1113 (quoting Aplt. Appx. at 12).
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court order enforced, notwithstanding that the legislature had required that such enforcement was
mandatory in all cases. Although the property right in this case is not the typical right to not
have government take one’s land, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly23 abandoned the strict
distinction between rights and mere privileges when it recognized that welfare benefits could be
considered property for the purposes of the clause.24 This was solidified in Roth v. Board of
Regents,25 where the Court stated, “the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden
distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ that once seemed to govern the applicability of
procedural due process rights.”26 In Roth the Court stated:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.27
But the existence of an entitlement is determined by an “independent source such as state law”
and the “rules or understandings” that it creates.28
The majority opinion in Castle Rock began its analysis by quoting much of this language
from Roth.29 It did not spend any time on the question of whether Ms. Gonzales had “more than
23

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
As Charles R. Reich has commented about the case:
“The question is: how much responsibility should the community take for the protection of the individual?
The community must choose among three responses. It can deny social responsibility entirely. It can
make economic protection of the individual a goal, but balance this goal against other goals which may be
given an equal or higher priority. Or the community can make individual security an absolute right.
Goldberg v. Kelly took the middle ground. It was a modest, moderate decision giving procedural protection
to welfare recipients.”
Charles R. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological view of Due Process, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731, 731
(1990).
25
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
26
Id. at 571.
27
Id. at 577.
28
Id. Charles Reich is generally credited with being the driving intellectual force behind the assault on the right
privilege distinction and for the recognition of “new property” rights. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich’s list of “new property” included: income and benefits, jobs, occupational licenses,
franchises, contracts, subsidies, public resources, and services, include postal service, police and fire services and
education among others. Id at 733-37. The issue of the property right in question is addressed infra throughout Part
III.
24
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an abstract need or desire for it” or “more than a unilateral expectation of it,” a claim upon which
she relied in her daily life, which “must not be arbitrarily undermined;” for she unquestionably
did expect and rely, and that reliance was arbitrarily undermined on the accepted facts. Rather,
the Court turned to the second prong of the test to determine if in fact the State had created such
an entitlement.
In doing so, the Court was relatively thorough in its attempt to nail down the lid of the
coffin of § 1983 procedural due process claims for the breach of mandatory arrest statutes. The
Court drove at least four nails into the coffin with a set of arguments that can be summarized as
follows:
1) The alleged mandatory arrest statute is not mandatory because it still allows for police
discretion and thus it cannot give rise to an entitlement;30
2) Even if the statute was mandatory, it mandates one of two options: arrest or seek an arrest
warrant; and since the second option is a procedure and not an end in itself, this cannot
give rise to an entitlement;31
3) Even if the statute mandated a non-discretionary duty on the part of the police, it would
still not follow that the intention was to provide the plaintiff a right or entitlement, rather
than simply fulfilling a public end, as does much of the criminal law;32and
4) Even if it did establish an entitlement, it is not a property entitlement protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not have monetary value
and was an incidental benefit of a general duty.33

29

Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803.
Id. at 2806-07. As will be demonstrated below, it is unclear if the Court is holding that no mandatory arrest
statute can really be mandatory, or if it is holding merely that this statute’s language fails to be clearly mandatory.
31
Id. at 2807-08. Justices Souter and Breyer, in their concurring opinion, rest on this argument.
32
Id. at 2808-09.
33
Id. at 2809-10
30
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In the process of making these arguments, the Court ignored the plain language of the statute34
and the restraining order, as well as the legislative history of the statute. It refused to certify the
question to the Colorado Supreme Court so it could decide whether its “mandatory arrest”
statute, along with the court order, create the state right or entitlement in issue. And finally, it
refused to defer to the decision of the six judge panel of the Tenth Circuit although deference is
the general rule in cases involving state law questions.35
These issues of method or approach to the case are addressed in a preliminary fashion by
the Court before the four sets of arguments mentioned above. Thus, these issues of methodology
will be addressed first, in Part II below. As will be demonstrated, if the Court had approached
the case in a principled fashion based on accepted canons of interpretation and precedent, there
would have been no need to reach the four sets of arguments, and Ms. Gonzales’s case could
have proceeded to the merits. Part III will address each set of arguments in turn, demonstrating
that:
5) The enforcement statute is mandatory because it does not allow for the type of discretion
that undermines the duty of enforcement;
6) The options of arrest or seek an arrest warrant are not discretionary options and they are
not merely procedures, but are ends that give rise to an entitlement;

34

Justice Scalia is known for his textualist approach to interpretation, which in his hands is in keeping with a
conservative approach to entitlements. As stated by Bradford C. Mank, “Justice Scalia and other modern textualists
often use "clear-statement canons" that require express congressional authorization for a particular type of
government regulatory action; this results in narrow constructions of a statute. Clear-statement principles are
specific applications of the common law's traditional presumption in favor of narrowly construing statutes that
arguably change the law. Most scholars believe that clear-statement principles generally tend to narrow the scope of
statutory language.” Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties,
Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 551 (1997-98). As will be
demonstrated below, in Castle Rock, Justice Scalia and the Majority avoid the textualist approach here because it
would require the recognition of new entitlements.
35
See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
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7) The statute serves both public and private ends and the history of the legislation and other
similar legislation indicates that that the intention was to create a right or entitlement in
the mandatory enforcement; and
8) Because the entitlement was created by the democratically elected and accountable
representatives of the people of Colorado, because it does have monetary value, and
because it is central to the purpose of the legislation, it is inappropriate for the Supreme
Court to unilaterally diminish this entitlement to something unworthy of due process
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the end it is argued that the majority of the Court has rewritten the Colorado statute, or
effectively struck down its mandatory arrest provisions for the purposes of § 1983 procedural
due process claims because they disagree with the state-based positive property right purportedly
created by the statute. The Court has done the functional equivalent to property rights that the
Lochner Court did to liberty rights one hundred years ago in Lochner v. New York,36 which
similarly – and as a result of what can fairly be called judicial activism – struck down a law
enacted by the New York legislature to protect the health and safety of bakery workers where
those workers otherwise had no protections from the arbitrary whims of their more powerful
employers. Here, the Court has sided with local government, insulating it from claims based on
the arbitrary denial of the right of enforcement, rather than helping a cognizable group of
vulnerable residents that the state has made it mandatory for municipalities to protect. The Court
has chosen the liberty of police officers to ignore their duties to enforce court ordered restraining
orders over the safety and security of the victims of domestic violence.
The damage that is done by a failure to hold the police accountable in such cases is not
limited to the harm that is caused to victims such as Ms. Gonzales’s daughters who might still be
36

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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alive today if the police had carried out their duties, nor even to those who will suffer in the
future because of the message such a decision sends. The damage is to our constitutional
compact and the rule of law. The damage is to the separation of powers; it undermines the role
of the legislature to make law and of our judiciary to interpret that law. Giving the police full
discretion to decide what law to enforce and what law to ignore transfers the law making and
interpreting functions of the legislature and courts to the police department. It effectively gives
them veto power. The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to ensure that states not arbitrarily
dole out rights and entitlement to some and deny them to others. Section 1983 gave victims a
right to redress for these types of violations, thus giving teeth to the requirement of due process.
The Court’s decision renders toothless the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
§ 1983 legislation, as well as the state legislation and the court order.37

II

THE MAJORITY’S APPROACH TO THE CASE
1) The plain language of the statute and restraining order, and legislative history

As noted above, section 18-6-803.5. of the Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated, “Crime of
violation of a protection order--penalty--peace officers' duties,” in subsection (3)(a) states that
37

This is worse than the case in which one branch of government drafts a check that another branch arbitrarily
refuses to honor. This is not a case in which a mere property right is at stake, as the Court stated in Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the “desire for and the right to the companionship, care, custody and management of
his or her children is … far more precious than any property right.” Id. at 758-59. The plaintiff did not make the
deprivation of life or liberty claim in this case, presumably because that would have been more awkward than
pigeon holing the deprivation as one of property. (Justice Souter refers to her property claim as “unconventional.”
125 S. Ct. at 2811 (concurring)). The legislation and court order in question were primarily designed to protect the
life and liberty of Ms. Gonzales and her children. It is unfortunate that the pigeon hole approach of the Court
discourages arguing that the lives and liberty of Ms. Gonzales and her children were put in jeopardy without due
process of law, because that is most clearly what transpired, rather than some crude deprivation of a property
interest. Ms. Gonzales had, in fact, shown the police “. . . a copy of the TRO and requested that it be enforced and
the three children be returned to her immediately.” Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800. The problem is that the rights
to life and liberty are considered negative rights or liberties, and not positive rights. Thus, it is awkward to argue
that the State has taken on the obligation to secure one’s life or liberty (which is what mandatory arrest statutes and
restraining orders are designed to do).
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“... A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order” and in
subsection 3(b) it reads in part that:
A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances,
seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has
information amounting to probable cause that:
(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a
protection order;
The Statute also identifies the beneficiary of the order in subsection (1)(a) “protected person”
as “…the person or persons identified in the protection order as the person or persons for whose
benefit the protection order was issued.” Thus, it is not the statute alone that imposes the duty
and creates the benefit, but the statute along with the actual individualized court order. The
circuit court found that the statute’s force was derived from the restraining order that was
“…issued by a court on behalf of a particular person and directed at specific individuals and the
police.”38 The circuit court pointed to the specific language of the court order in this case:
[y]ou shall use every reasonable means to enforce this restraining order." Id. It further
dictated that an officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the
circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of the restrained person when you have
information amounting to probable cause that the restrained person has violated or
attempted to violate any provision of this order and the restrained person has been
properly served with a copy of this order or has received actual notice of the existence of
this order.39
While it is conceded that the repeated use of the word “shall” is not the same word as the word
“mandatory,” there are few words with a clearer meaning.40 “You shall” means that one is
required to, or one has a duty to, do that which follows the verb.41 On a plain textualist reading

38

Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1104.
Id. at 1103-04.
40
“The factor which most heavily weighs in favor of a mandatory construction is the use of the word ‘shall’ in the
provision at issue. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the word ‘shall’ generally indicates that the General
Assembly intended the provision to be mandatory.” DiMarco v. Department of Revenue, MVD, 857 P.2d 1349,
1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (citing People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986)).
41
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), reads:
39
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of the statute it is hard to explain what other meaning “shall” could have, given that neighboring
provisions use the word “may.”42 The majority of the Court reads them to mean the same
thing,43 but to do so violates one of the most basic canons of statutory construction.44 It
effectively voids the word “shall” in the text, rendering it superfluous. Although ignored by the
Court, Colorado legislation provides guidance as to how its provisions are to be read. Colorado
Revised Statutes section 2-4-101 (Common and technical usage) reads in part, “Words and
phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common
usage.”45
The Court seems to concede that the plain meaning of these provisions does mandate
enforcement, but it does not think they mean what they say because of the “well established”
tradition of discretion that has coexisted with other mandatory arrest statutes in the past.46
Justice Scalia quotes from the commentary to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice for this

shall, vb. 1. Has a duty to; more broadly, is required to <the requester shall send notice> <notice shall be
sent>. • This is the mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold. 2. Should
(as often interpreted by courts) <all claimants shall request mediation>. 3. May <no person shall enter the
building without first signing the roster>. • When a negative word such as not or no precedes shall (as in
the example in angle brackets), the word shall often means may. What is being negated is permission, not a
requirement. 4. Will (as a future-tense verb) <the corporation shall then have a period of 30 days to object>.
5. Is entitled to <the secretary shall be reimbursed for all expenses>. • Only sense 1 is acceptable under
strict standards of drafting. (emphasis added).
42
For instance, section 18-6-803.5(6)(a) of Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated (LEXIS through 2004 Supplement
(2004 Sess.)) states that “Such peace officer may transport, or obtain transportation for, the alleged victim to
shelter.” (emphasis added).
43
This immediately brings the question to mind: How does the majority interpret all the “Thou shalts’” in the Ten
Commandments?
44
As the Court stated in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. E.P.A., “It is, moreover, ‘a cardinal
principle of statutory construction' that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’" 540 U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004
)
(quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).
Colorado Revised Statutes section 2-4-201 (Intentions in the enactment of statutes) states, “(1) In enacting a statute,
it is presumed that: …(b) The entire statute is intended to be effective.”
45
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (LEXIS through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)). “If the language of a statute is plain
and its meaning clear, it must be applied as written.” Interest of A.R.W., 903 P.2d 10, 14 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing Heagney v. Schneider, 677 P.2d 446 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)).
46
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806.
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view,47 but the language he quotes does not actually further the view. The reasons he gives for
why “mandatory arrest statutes” do not mean “mandatory” include, “…legislative history,
insufficient resources and sheer impossibility.”48
In his scholarly work, Justice Scalia rejects the use of legislative history as a means of
determining the meaning of a statute and in fact claims that use of legislative history is
undemocratic.49 Yet here in Castle Rock he cites it as authority for his departure from the plain
meaning of the text. If we are now to take legislative history seriously, then it is important to
look to the actual legislation or legislation of its type, rather than to a broader category of
legislation. The legislative history of the Colorado legislation and legislation of its type (i.e.,
mandatory arrest statutes in the restraining order or protection order context, rather than
mandatory arrest statutes generally) do reinforce the “mandatory” reading of the legislation. The
majority of the Court cannot point to any evidence that the drafters of the Colorado statute
meant “may” when they used the term “shall.” This is not a case of the circuit court looking out
into the crowd at a cocktail party and picking out its friends.50 At this particular party, there
simply were no guests who disagreed with the view that this legislation was designed to make
enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.51 In such instances where the language is clear

47

Id. (quoting 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 1-4.5, commentary, pp. 1-124 to 1-12
5 (2d ed. 1980)
(footnotes omitted)).
48
Id.
49
"My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the
law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of
a statute's meaning." Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 36 (Amy Gutmann ed.
1996). Scalia further states that ". . . it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed even with fair
government, to have the meaning of law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than what the lawgiver
promulgated." Id. at 17.
50
Justice Scalia quotes Justice Leventhal's turn of phrase to the effect that legislative history is like a cocktail party
where one can always look over the heads of the crowd and pick out her or his friends. See id. at 36.
51
Scalia notes that the Court of Appeals quoted a lawmaker's description of how the bill ‘would really attack the
domestic violence problems:’
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and there is no evidence of a contrary view in the legislative history, the interpretation appears
well grounded.52 The conduct here is worse than looking out over the party for one’s friends in
order to bolster one’s personal views of the meaning of the legislation.53 Having been unable to
find a friend at this party, and at any other party dealing with restraining orders, the Court has
gone party hopping in order to find friendly support for its views.54
Setting this aside, the other two reasons given in the ABA commentary do not in any
way detract from the mandatory nature of the statute and its directive, or of the directive in the
court order. If “insufficient resources” or “sheer impossibility” turned mandatory requirements
The entire criminal justice system must act in a consistent manner, which does not now occur. The police
must make probable cause arrests. The prosecutors must prosecute every case. Judges must apply
appropriate sentences, and probation officers must monitor their probationers closely. And the offender
needs to be sentenced to offender-specific therapy.
The entire system must send the same message . . . [that] violence is criminal. And so we hope that House
Bill 1253 starts us down this road. 366 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Tr. of Colorado House Judiciary Hearings on
House Bill 1253, Feb. 15, 1994) (emphases omitted).
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2805 n.6 (internal quotations omitted).
He does not refer to any contrary authority regarding the legislative history of this statute, nor any regarding the host
of mandatory arrest statutes in the restraining order or protection order context. Similarly the petitioner could not
refer to any evidence of contrary intent with regard to mandatory arrest statutes in the context of restraining orders
or protection orders. See Petitioner Br. and Petitioner Reply Br. The Reply Brief, like Justice Scalia’s opinion,
addresses other types of mandatory arrest statutes.
52
There really can be no worry of an undemocratic interpretation in such cases, at least not on Justice Scalia’s own
views.
53
The legislature of Colorado must have been aware of the existing legislation in other jurisdictions (at least fifteen
others), and the fact that in the first jurisdiction to implement such legislation, Oregon, its courts had decided that
the legislation meant what it said when it used the term “shall,” i.e., that enforcement was mandatory. See Nearing
v.Weaver , 670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983) (en banc) (holding the statute's mandatory directive formed the basis for the suit
because it was "a specific duty imposed by statute for the benefit of individuals previously identified by judicial
order"). For further treatment of Nearing, see infra note 93 and accompanying text.
54
Justice Stevens alludes to this fact when he states, “First, the Court places undue weight on the various statutes
throughout the country that seemingly mandate police enforcement but are generally understood to preserve police
discretion. As a result, the Court gives short shrift to the unique case of ‘mandatory arrest’ statutes in the domestic
violence context; States passed a wave of these statutes in the 1980's and 1990's with the unmistakable goal of
eliminating police discretion in this area.” Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2816 (dissenting). See also id. at 2817 n.7
(referring the reader to “Fuller & Stansberry, 1994 Legislature Strengthens Domestic Violence Protective Orders, 23
COLO. LAW. 2327 (1994) (‘The 1994 Colorado legislative session produced several significant domestic abuse bills
that strengthened both civil and criminal restraining order laws and procedures for victims of domestic violence’);
Id. at 2329 (‘Although many law enforcement jurisdictions already take a proactive approach to domestic violence,
arrest and procedural policies vary greatly from one jurisdiction to another. H. B. 94-1253 mandates the arrest of
domestic violence perpetrators and restraining order violaters [sic]. H. B. 94-1090 repeals the requirement that
protected parties show a copy of their restraining order to enforcing officers. In the past, failure to provide a copy of
the restraining order has led to hesitation from police to enforce the order for fear of an illegal arrest. The new
statute also shields arresting officers from liability; this is expected to reduce concerns about enforcing the
mandatory arrest requirements’ (footnotes omitted))).
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into discretionary choices then there would be nothing in the law that was mandatory except for
perhaps “death and taxes.” Insufficient resources and sheer impossibility may be justifications
for why the police are unable to immediately arrest or obtain a warrant, but they do not defeat
the requirement to “use every reasonable means to enforce th[e] restraining order.” The drafters
of the statute presumably understood that ought implies can and did not mandate the
impossible.55 The fact that impossibility might excuse performance of a duty once the
impossibility arises does not negate the duty when the impossibility is not present. There is no
evidence whatsoever that insufficient resources or impossibility are implicated in general in this
context, much less in the specific case of Ms. Gonzales.
Venturing even further afield in order to find a friend, the Court cites and quotes from
the Court’s decision in Chicago v. Morales, 56 to justify the view. The reasoning here is further
addressed below, but let it suffice to say that the case is off point. The case involved an
ordinance that included the phrase “‘shall order’ persons to disperse in certain circumstances.”57
The Court found that the police still had discretion in the face of this language.58 The Court fails
to mention that the ordinance was found to be unconstitutionally vague because it did not set
minimal guidelines for law enforcement or provide adequate notice to the public of what was
proscribed.59 Specifically, the “in certain circumstances” part of the phrase, rather than the

55

The notion that “ought” implies “can” is a classic ethical maxim that one is not obligated to do that which one
cannot do. The idea is generally attributed to Immanuel Kant in his work on ethics. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON (T.K. Abbot trans., Prometheus Books 1996) (1788). It is also found in the Colorado Revised
Statutes section 2-4-201 (d) (Intentions in the enactment of statutes) which states, “(1) In enacting a statute, it is
presumed that: …(d) A result feasible of execution is intended.”
56
527 U.S. 41 (1999).
57
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (citing Morales, 527 U.S. at 47 n.2).
58
Id. (citing Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 n.32).
59
Morales, 527 U.S. at 56-115.
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“shall order” part, was held to be unconstitutionally vague in that case,60 and was the reason for
the finding that there was police discretion. The mandatory nature of “shall order” was not in
issue. In fact, to the extent that it indicated that the police would enforce the ordinance, it
furthered the argument that the ordinance could be applied arbitrarily in violation of due process.

2) Refusal to certify the question to the state supreme court or to defer to the circuit court

Although the Supreme Court made the central question in this case the state law question
regarding the establishment of an entitlement in favor of Ms. Gonzales,61 the majority of the
Supreme Court did not find it prudent to certify the question to the Colorado Supreme Court.
The Court rejected the idea that the it should certify the case on the basis that the parties did not
desire to have the question certified.62
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, put forth a strong array of arguments in favor of sua sponte
certification of the question, including “…federal-state comity, constitutional avoidance, judicial
efficiency, and the desire to settle correctly a recurring issue of state law.”63 One might add that
if the Court was worried about activism by judges who are not democratically accountable, that
worry is more valid in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court and the circuit court than the Colorado
Supreme Court.64 Although not democratically elected, judges in Colorado are subjected to

60

The circumstances in which the police were to order people to disperse was when they determined that people
were “loitering,” and the definition for this was found to be vague. Id. at 56-59.
61
Justice Scalia may be thinking that the real issue in the case is a federal issue when he concludes, near the end of
his decision, that “This result reflects our continuing reluctance to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as 'a font of tort
law.' Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 (internal citations omitted). This is an indication of his hostility to the § 1983
legislation, which explicitly makes violation of the Fourteenth Amendment a font for tort law.
62
Id. at 2804 n.4.
63
Id. at 2816 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2815-16.
64
For Justice Scalia’s views on judicial activism and principles of interpretation see, e.g. Justice Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989); Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849 (1989).
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periodic votes on their retention by the citizens of the state.65 Thus, there is a further check on
any tendency to be activist that is not present in the federal system.
Even if the Court did not find these arguments persuasive it still would have been the
practice to defer to the circuit court’s determination as to the matter of state law, absent a finding
that the decision was “clearly wrong.”66 The reasons for the rule of deference are based on both
efficiency and local knowledge of law and practice.67 It is an activist move to take the state law
question out of the hands of both the state court and of the circuit court sitting in the relevant
state, absent some compelling reason. In response to Respondent’s contention that the Supreme
Court was obliged to give deference to the circuit court, Justice Scalia flippantly stated, “We will
not, of course, defer to the Tenth Circuit on the ultimate issue.”68 His reason is stated as follows:
We have said that a “presumption of deference [is] given the views of a federal court as
to the law of a State within its jurisdiction.” Phillips, supra, at 167. That presumption can
be overcome, however, see Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 145 (1996) (per curiam), and
we think deference inappropriate here. The Tenth Circuit’s opinion, …did not draw upon
a deep well of state-specific expertise, but consisted primarily of quoting language from
the restraining order, the statutory text, and state-legislative hearing transcripts. See 366
F.3d, at 1103-1109.69

65

See Colorado Bar Association, Where Do (Colorado) Judges Come From?, at
http://www.cobar.org/group/display.cfm?GenID=429 (last visited Aug. 13, 2005)
66
The Court in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), stated:
The Court has stated that it will defer to lower courts on state-law issues unless there is "plain" error,
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 118 (1943); the view of the lower court is "clearly wrong," The Tungus
v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 596 (1959); or the construction is "clearly erroneous," United States v.
Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 527 (1960), or "unreasonable," Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87
(1949). On occasion, then, the Court has refused to follow the views of a lower federal court on an issue of
state law. In Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 683-84 (1972), e. g., we refused to accept a three-judge
District Court's construction of a single statutory word based on the dictionary definition of that language
where more reliable indicia of the legislative intent were available.
Id. at 500 n.9.
67
As Stevens states, “[t]his policy is not only efficient, but it reflects ‘our belief that district courts and courts of
appeal are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective States.’ Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500-501, 86 L. Ed. 2d 394, 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985); Hillsborough v.Cromwell , 326
U.S. 620, 629-630, 90 L. Ed. 358, 66 S. Ct. 445 (1946) (endorsing "great deference to the views of the judges of
those courts 'who are familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law and practice'"). Leavitt v.Jane L. , 518 U.S.
137, 145, 135 L. Ed. 2d 443, 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996) (per curiam).” Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2814 (dissenting).
68
Id. at 2803.
69
Id. at 2804.
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None of this helps the Court’s argument. The per curiam decision in Leavitt was based on the
finding that the circuit court was clearly wrong in failing to give effect to the plain language of
the statute.70 Perhaps more importantly, whereas the circuit court in Gonzales did not reverse the
district court on the issue before the Supreme Court (the issue of establishing an entitlement), the
“Court of Appeals panel [in Leavitt] consisting of judges from Oklahoma, Colorado, and Kansas
…reversed the District Court of Utah on a point of Utah law,” and it was that very issue that was
before the Court.71 Thus, unlike in Leavitt, there are no compelling reasons to deviate from the
general rule of deferring to the circuit court. The Court has failed to establish that there is a more
permissive standard than the “clearly wrong” standard. As argued above, the circuit court
opinion, based on the language of the restraining order, the statutory text and the state-legislative
hearing transcripts, was solidly grounded and by no means could it be labeled “clearly wrong.”
The Court does not even attempt to label it as such, but merely states that “we think deference
inappropriate here.”72 The Court has both distorted the rule and misapplied it to the facts of the
present case.
III

THE COURT’S ASSAULT ON THE PROPERTY ENTITLEMENT TO THE MANDATORY
ENFORCEMENT OF A RESTRAINING ORDER

1) The enforcement statute is mandatory because it does not allow for the type of discretion
that undermines the duty of enforcement

70

As the Court stated, “The Court of Appeals' opinion not only did not regard the explicit language of § 317 as
determinative -- it did not even use it as the point of departure for addressing the severability question.” 518 U.S. at
140. It went on to state, in the section cited by Justice Scalia, that the “… general presumption [of deference] is
obviously inapplicable where the court of appeals' state-law ruling is plainly wrong, a conclusion that the dissent
does not even contest in this case.” Id. at 145 (emphasis added). In Castle Rock, it is Justice Scalia who is ignoring
the explicit language of the statute, not the circuit court.
71
Id. at 145. As Justice Stevens points out, “… those courts disagreed only over the extent to which a probablecause determination requires the exercise of discretion. Compare 366 F.3d at 1105-1110, with App. to Pet. for Cert.
122a (District Court opinion).” Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2815 n.2 (dissenting).
72
See supra note 69.
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The first set of arguments by the Court to justify its decision rests on the claim that the
purported mandatory arrest statute is not mandatory because it allows for discretion.73 As noted
above, the Court justified this holding in part by comparing the mandatory arrest language of this
statute with other states’ statutes that on their faces mandated arrest, but in fact had been held to
be discretionary.74 According to the Court, “Our cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected
entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.”75 The Court seems
to indicate that it is impossible to create a true mandatory enforcement statute, i.e. a statute that
gets rid of all police discretion. In fact the Court quotes Chicago v. Morales to the effect that it
is “’common sense that all police officers must use some discretion in deciding when and where
to enforce city ordinances.’” 76 The very next sentence appears to provide hope for in it the
majority states, “…a true mandate of police action would require some stronger indication from
the Colorado Legislature than ‘Shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order”
(or even ‘shall arrest… or seek a warrant’), §§ 18—6—803.5(3)(a), (b).”77
If this last sentence is the holding then there is hope that if states made the language more
clearly mandatory, by perhaps adding such language as “really mandatory,” “absolutely must,”
or “no discretion,” then perhaps this would give rise to a right or entitlement to mandatory
action. Clearer language may at least convince some members of the Court that the state in
question intended to create a right to mandatory enforcement. However, this does not
necessarily follow, for if the prior sentence is the real holding, then no matter how strong the
language is, it is in fact not humanly possible to squeeze out all of the discretion. If all you need

73

Id. at 2802.
Id. (referring also to 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 1-4.5, commentary, at 1-124 --1-125 (2d ed. 1980)).
75
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803 (citing Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63
(1989)).
76
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 n.32) (emphasis in Castle Rock).
77
Id.
74
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is an iota or modicum of discretion to defeat the entitlement claim, then the claim will always be
defeated.
But this proves too much. The Court is correct to hold that as a matter of common sense
there is no way to remove all discretion. As long as the statute is directed at human beings to
carry out a function, there will always be some discretion as to when, or how a person will carry
out the function.78 This would defeat almost every entitlement claim that has arisen, be it health
care, as pointed out by Justice Stevens,79 or any of a number of other entitlements that the courts
have found to give rise to due process protection including: continued public employment in
Perry v. Sindermann,80 free education in Goss v. Lopez, 81 garnished wages in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.,82 professional licenses in Barry v. Barchi,83 drivers’ licenses in Bell v.
Burson,84 causes of action in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,85 and the receipt of government
services, including: utility services in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,86 disability
benefits in Mathews v. Eldridge,87 and welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly.88

78

This is why it is common for the courts to distinguish between different types of discretion. As the circuit court
noted:
In Allen, the Supreme Court noted one could use the term "discretion" in two distinct ways. “In one sense
of the word, an official has discretion when he or she 'is simply not bound by standards set by the authority
in question.'" Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 375, 107 S. Ct. 2415 (1987) (citing R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32 (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 1996) (1977)). In the alternative, "the term
discretion may instead signify that 'an official must use judgment in applying the standards set him [or her]
by authority.' " Id. (citing DWORKIN, supra at 31, 32). See also Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d
690, 695 (10th Cir.1988).
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1105-06. At best the discretion here is in how to carry out the policy or instructions set down
for the officer, and not the discretion to ignore the policy or to set new policy.
79
Id. at 2820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80
408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
81
419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
82
395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
83
443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979).
84
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
85
455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
86
436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
87
424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
88
397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
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There may or may not be more or less discretion as to when or how these entitlements are
delivered, but there can be no question that there is some discretion. Given that a majority of the
Court would not be inclined to deny these entitlements, then the question shifts back to how
much discretion is too much. This may depend on the nature of the endeavor, for some
endeavors require less by way of exercising judgment or discretion. In the case of police
enforcement, it would not be wise for the State to require that no matter what an officer was
doing that she or he would be required to drop everything immediately and arrest or hunt down
and arrest someone for whom there is cause to suspect that a restraining order has been violated.
This would lead to absurd results; she or he may be in the middle of trying to arrest someone
who is on a shooting spree. Nonetheless, the State may wish to give those within its borders the
right to have a court ordered protection order enforced. It may wish to take away the discretion
of the police to ignore these orders as a matter of policy and practice. Thus, it is reasonable that
it choose language that is appropriate to the task given the conditions. While the use of “all
deliberate speed” has proven too flexible,89 the use of “[s]hall use every reasonable means to
enforce a restraining order” along with “shall arrest… or seek a warrant,’” 90 as found in the
Colorado legislation, appears appropriate to this end.
The appropriateness of this language is bolstered by the fact that other states have used
similar language in their statutes and courts have found these statutes to give rise to a right or
entitlement to enforcement. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, refers to four cases from four
89

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The relief granted in Brown II was flawed in that it did not actually
provide a remedy for the plaintiffs, as Paul Gewirtz states, in Brown II "[a]ll deliberate speed" authorized and
yielded an imperfect remedy; the delay that it permitted resulted in a failure to implement fully the rights and
substantive remedial goals stated (albeit vaguely) in Brown I. This delay meant not only that effective relief for
some members of the plaintiff class would be postponed but also that some members of the plaintiff class would fail
to receive relief at all since they would graduate before any desegregation would actually occur.” Remedies and
Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 612 (1983) (notes omitted). See also the very slow history of desegregation postBrown. See, e.g., CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004).
90
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(a), (b) (LEXIS through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)).
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different states that have interpreted their mandatory arrest statutes to mean what they say, i.e.
that an arrest is mandatory.91 The majority largely ignores these decisions and the statutes that
they are based on. Justice Stevens mentions them and connects them together with the Colorado
statute and a whole wave of statutes throughout the country that were enacted for the purpose of
removing or limiting the discretion of the police to enforce protection or restraining orders.92
Nonetheless their authority is dubious given that Stevens does not address the exact language of
the statutes in question.
A survey of these four cases and the statutes they refer to should answer any nagging
questions about how relevant they are to the Colorado case. A brief survey reveals that although
there are a few important differences, the language in those statutes is no more mandatory than
that found in the Colorado statute. If we look to the recent case of Conerly v. Town of
Franlinton,93 based on Louisiana legislation, it is apparent the language there was less
mandatory than that in the Colorado statute addressed in Castle Rock. Further, if the Colorado
General Assembly wished to make enforcement optional or discretionary it could have used
language clearly indicating so as found in other jurisdictions.

Oregon94
The language of the Oregon statute is nearly identical to that of the Colorado statute. It reads:
133.310. Authority of peace officer to arrest without warrant.
…

91

Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d. 137 (Or. 1983); Matthews v. Pickett, 996 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1999); Campbell v.
Campbell, 682 A.2d 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Donaldson v. Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992).
92
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2818 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 4.
93
No. 03-1507, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12395 (E.D. La. Jun. 28, 2004).
94
Note that Oregon, in 1977, was the first state to enact mandatory arrest laws in domestic violence cases. Joan
Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 46, 63
(1992).
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(3) A peace officer shall arrest and take into custody a person without a warrant when the
peace officer has probable cause to believe that:
(a) There exists an order issued pursuant to ORS 107.095(1)(c) or (d), 107.716 or
107.718 restraining the person; and
(b) A true copy of the order and proof of service on the person has been filed as required
in ORS 107.720; and
(c) The peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
violated the terms of that order.95
When analyzing the provision the court in Nearing stated:
ORS 133.310(3) prescribes that a peace officer "shall arrest and take into custody a
person without a warrant" when the officer has probable cause to believe that an
order under the statute has been served and filed and that the person has violated the
order. The widespread refusal or failure of police officers to remove persons involved in
episodes of domestic violence was presented to the legislature as the main reason for
tightening the law so as to require enforcement of restraining orders by mandatory arrest
and custody.96
The court went on to point out that the mandatory language in the Oregon legislation was
“unique among statutory arrest provisions because the legislature chose mandatory arrest as the
best means to reduce recurring domestic violence…in order to protect the named persons for
whose protection the order is issued, not to protect the community at large by general law
enforcement activity.” 97 Thus, the point of the legislation was to create the specific duty of
enforcement embodied in a special relationship between the police and the protected person
which generates an entitlement on the part of the protected person. This is accomplished through

95

OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1977). Note that the mandatory arrest statute did not immediately result in more
arrests by the police. As is pointed out by both Ruth Gundle in Civil Liability for Police Failure to Arrest: Nearing
v. Weaver, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 259, 262 (1986), and Sue Ellen Schuerman in Establishing a Tort Duty for
Police Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence, 34 ARIZ . LAW. REV. 355 n.38, n.117, the arrest rates remained low
(citing a 1979 study by the Oregon Governor's Commission for Women). This prompted the litigation by the
Oregon Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence on behalf of Ms. Nearing in the hopes that a successful tort
action would force compliance with the law. Gundle, supra, at 262; Schuerman, supra, at n.117). Schuerman also
notes a similar problem in compliance following the enactment of legislation in Minnesota. Schuerman, supra, at
n.38.
96
670 P.2d at 142. The court also noted that like the provisions of the Colorado statute, “Subsection (3) appears
after two subsections that state when an officer "may" arrest a person without a warrant, and the contrasting use of
"shall" in subsection (3) is no accident.” Id. In light of the public nature of the litigation in this case, it is hard to
imagine that the drafters of the Colorado statute were ignorant of how the language they chose would be interpreted
by the courts.
97
Id. at 143.
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the protection order which “…identif[ies] with precision when, to whom, and under what
circumstances police protection must be afforded.”98

Tennessee
The Tennessee code provides:
36-3-611. Arrest for violation of protection order
(a) An arrest for violation of an order of protection issued pursuant to this part may be
with or without warrant. Any law enforcement officer shall arrest the respondent without
a warrant if:
(1) The officer has proper jurisdiction over the area in which the violation occurred;
(2) The officer has reasonable cause to believe the respondent has violated or is in
violation of an order for protection; and
(3) The officer has verified whether an order of protection is in effect against the
respondent. If necessary, the police officer may verify the existence of an order for
protection by telephone or radio communication with the appropriate law enforcement
department.
(b) No ex parte order of protection can be enforced by arrest under this section until the
respondent has been served with the order of protection or otherwise has acquired actual
knowledge of such order.99
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Matthews v. Pickett,100 certified the case from the Sixth
Circuit to answer the question as to whether a protection order could give rise to a “special duty”
to protect that would override the public duty doctrine.101 The court found that it could and that
the respondents could be held liable under the Governmental Tort Liability Act.102

The court held that:
Both the order of protection in this case and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-611 mandated that
the deputies arrest Winningham upon "reasonable cause to believe that [Winningham]
had violated the order of protection." The record supports a finding that the deputies'
failure to arrest Winningham was a deviation from a policy as expressed by statutory
mandate and was operational in nature. See generally Watts v. Robertson County, 849

98

Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611 (LEXIS through 2004 Sess.) (emphasis added).
100
996 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1999).
101
Id. at 163.
102
Id.
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S.W.2d 798 (Tenn. App. 1992); Doe v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899
(Tenn. App. 1992).103
The finding that the deviation was operational in nature meant that it was about failing to carry
out the established policy. While there still may be discretion in such cases, the discretion is in
connection with how to carry out the policy rather than about full discretion to set or change the
policy.104

New Jersey
The relevant New Jersey statute reads:
§ 2C:25-31. Contempt, law enforcement procedures
Where a law enforcement officer finds that there is probable cause that a defendant has
committed contempt of an order entered pursuant to the provisions of P.L. 1981, c. 426
(C. 2C:25-1 et seq.) or P.L. 1991, c. 261 (C. 2C:25-17 et seq.), the defendant shall be
arrested and taken into custody by a law enforcement officer…105
The court in Campbell v. Campbell held that the police officers did not have discretion to arrest
the plaintiff’s husband under this New Jersey statute and therefore they were not immune under
N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a) which provides immunity for injury resulting from the exercise of judgment
or discretion.106

Washington
Washington Revised Code 10.31.100 reads:
103

Id. at 164.
It is common for immunity statutes to recognize this distinction, providing immunity for policy decisions but not
for implementation decisions. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal,County, School, and State Tort Liability § 78 (2001).
Section 78 of volume 57 n.1 states:
[i]n administering the test distinguishing between discretionary acts and ministerial functions, the
key factor is the presence of basic policy formulation, planning or policy decisions, which are
characterized by an exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion, because most
states' laws provide for immunity if the government was acting in that manner at the time of the
injury.
105
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-31 (LEXIS through the 211th Legis. 2d Ann. Sess. (2005), through P.L. 2005 Ch. 114)
(emphasis added).
106
Campbell, 682 A.2d at 274-75.
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§ 10.31.100. Arrest without warrant
…
(2) A police officer shall arrest and take into custody, pending release on bail, personal
recognizance, or court order, a person without a warrant when the officer has probable
cause to believe that:
(a) An order has been issued of which the person has knowledge under RCW
26.44.063, or chapter 10.99, 26.09, 26.10, 26.26, 26.50, or 74.34 RCW restraining
the person and the person has violated the terms of the order restraining the
person from acts or threats of violence, or restraining the person from going onto
the grounds of or entering a residence, workplace, school, or day care, or
prohibiting the person from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining
within, a specified distance of a location or, in the case of an order issued under
RCW 26.44.063, imposing any other restrictions or conditions upon the person;107
The statute was noted in dicta in Donaldson v Seattle where it stated, “Generally, where an
officer has legal grounds to make an arrest he has considerable discretion to do so. In regard to
domestic violence, the rule is the reverse. If the officer has legal grounds to arrest pursuant to the
statute, he has a mandatory duty to make the arrest. RCW 10.31.000.”108

Louisiana
Lousiana Revised Statutes 14:79(E) states,
Law enforcement officers shall use every reasonable means, including but not limited to
immediate arrest of the violator, to enforce a preliminary or permanent injunction or
protective order...or to enforce a temporary restraining order or ex parte protective
order."109

The district court in Conerly stated:
The significant distinction between the Colorado restraining order and statute and the
Louisiana restraining order and statute is that a Louisiana police officer's discretion is
notably broader. Even when there is probable cause that the restrained person is in
violation of the order, Louisiana police officers are not required to arrest the person. In
Colorado, "if the officer has probable cause to believe the terms of the court order are
being violated, the officer is required to arrest or to seek a warrant to arrest the offending
107

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100 (LEXIS through 2004 Gen. Election (2005 c 2)).
Donaldson, 831 P.2d at 1103.
109
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79(E) (WESTLAW through all 2004 First Extraordinary and Reg. Sess. Acts)
(emphasis added).
108
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party." Castle Rock, 366 F.3d at 1106.110
The court went on to quote from Ardoin v. City of Mamou,111 stating, “’While the statute
authorizes arrest of the violator, it does not mandate arrest unless arrest is required to enforce the
statute.’ Indeed, ‘the word 'may' is not mandatory, but rather implies that a peace officer's power
to arrest without a warrant is discretionary.’"112
Montana
Finally, if the Colorado General Assembly had wanted to create discretionary language, it
could have chosen to use the word “may” or it could have stated that “arrest is the preferred
response,” as Montana did in Montana Code Annotated section 46-6-311 (“Basis for arrest
without warrant -- arrest of predominant aggressor”) which states:
(1) A peace officer may arrest a person when a warrant has not been issued if the officer
has probable cause to believe that the person is committing an offense or that the person
has committed an offense and existing circumstances require immediate arrest.
(2) (a) The summoning of a peace officer to a place of residence by a partner or family
member constitutes an exigent circumstance for making an arrest. Arrest is the preferred
response in partner or family member assault cases involving injury to the victim, use or
threatened use of a weapon, violation of a restraining order, or other imminent danger to
the victim.113
As these cases and legislation demonstrate, it was reasonable for Colorado to adopt the language
that it did in order to make enforcement of restraining orders mandatory. In fact, Colorado had
the advantage of both the existing Oregon legislation and case law interpreting the language to
mean mandatory. The majority does not point to a single case in which the courts have
interpreted a statute purporting to mandate arrest for the violation of a restraining order as nonmandatory.
110

Conerly, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12395, at *20-21.
685 So. 2d 294 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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Id. (quoting Ardoin, 685 So. 2d at 299).
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MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (LEXIS through all 2003 legislation. No legislation enacted in 2004) (empahsis
added).
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2) The options of arrest or seek an arrest warrant are not discretionary options and they are
not merely procedures, but are ends that give rise to an entitlement

Although the Court does not squarely address these cases and the statutes they are based
on, its second set of arguments provides a response. None of these statutes include the option of
seeking an arrest warrant should an arrest be impractical.114 The Court’s second argument is that
even if the statute was mandatory it mandates one of two options, arrest or seek an arrest
warrant, and since the second option is a procedure and not an end in itself, this cannot give rise
to an entitlement.115
It may be noted at the outset that the district court in Conerly” did not find that this part
of the Colorado statute distracted from the mandatory nature of the statute.116 The mere fact that
the police have an option does not mean that the police can choose to do nothing. Further, in the
case of Colorado, the choice between the two options is not discretionary, as the officer is only
permitted to seek an arrest warrant if an arrest is impractical. The option is an improvement on
those statutes that merely make the arrest mandatory, for if the arrest is impractical it simply will
not be done, mandatory language or not. Those statutes that do not fill the gap by requiring that
the officer seek an arrest warrant actually provide more discretion to the police officer to do
nothing in the face of the impracticality of arrest. Thus, it makes perfect sense to require that the
officer seek a warrant as a means of enforcing the order under such circumstances. It gives
further clarity and direction to an officer who is to “use every reasonable means to enforce the
order.”
114

Note that a few other states have adopted the optional language (see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.11 (LEXIS
through 2005 Edition (2004 legis.)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3 (b)(IV) (LEXIS THROUGH JAN. 2004 SESS.); but as
of yet there is no case interpreting whether they are mandatory.
115
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2807-08. As noted supra note 31, Justices Souter and Breyer, in their concurring
opinion, rest on this argument.
116
Conerly, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12395, at *20-21.
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Nonetheless is can still be maintained that the second option is no more than an
entitlement to a procedure, which the Supreme Court has held is not enough for the attachment
of a due process right. As the majority argues:
The problem with this is that the seeking of an arrest warrant would be an entitlement to
nothing but procedure -- which we have held inadequate even to support standing, see
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992);
much less can it be the basis for a property interest. See post, at 3-4 (SOUTER, J.,
concurring). After the warrant is sought, it remains within the discretion of a judge
whether to grant it, and after it is granted, it remains within the discretion of the police
whether and when to execute it. Respondent would have been assured nothing but the
seeking of a warrant. This is not the sort of "entitlement" out of which a property interest
is created.117
As noted by Justice Scalia, his argument is supported by the concurring opinion of Justice
Souter.118 Souter bases his opinion at least in part on Ms. Gonzales’s brief, as follows:
"Ms. Gonzales alleges that . . . she was denied the process laid out in the statute. The
police did not consider her request in a timely fashion, but instead repeatedly required her
to call the station over several hours. The statute promised a process by which her
restraining order would be given vitality through careful and prompt consideration of an
enforcement request . . . . Denial of that process drained all of the value from her property
interest in the restraining order." Brief for Respondent 10.119
He concludes from this that “[t]he argument is unconventional because the state-law benefit for
which it claims federal procedural protection is itself a variety of procedural regulation, a set of
rules to be followed by officers exercising the State's executive power: use all reasonable means
to enforce, arrest upon demonstrable probable cause, get a warrant, and so on, seeante , at 23.”120
Justice Souter errs in two respects. First, he errs in reducing her claim to a claim to
procedure, which is not supported in the language he quotes. Ms. Gonzales was not claiming the
117

Id. at 2808 (n.11 omitted).
Justice Souter also makes a few other arguments against an entitlement, including the inability of the plaintiff to
stop the police from arresting or to stop the court from issuing a contempt order. Id. at 2811. As Justice Steven’s
persuasively points out, an entitlement to go to school does not mean that one is entitled to refuse to go to school.
Mandatory attendance laws do not defeat the entitlement. Id. at 2824 n.20.
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Id. at 2811. (Souter, J., concurring).
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process in the statute as her state law entitlement. She stated that the failure to follow the
process in the statute drained the value from her property interest in the restraining order. Her
claim was a right to the enforcement of the order. The second error is to characterize
enforcement of the order as a “procedure.” The move mirrors the majority’s collapse of the
duty- discretion distinction by collapsing every command that requires some modicum of
judgment into a discretion, thereby defeating any claim that the command creates a mandatory
duty. If “use all reasonable means to enforce, arrest upon demonstrable probable cause, get a
warrant, and so on,” are categorized as merely procedural, and thus incapable of giving rise to an
entitlement, then virtually no obligation to provide a service can give rise to an entitlement.
Unlike entitlements to goods, entitlements to services all require process and are arguably
reducible to a process in the same way that making an arrest is a process, getting a warrant and
“so on” are processes. The court order reads like the terms of one side of a contract that tells us
what services the police are required to render to the beneficiary. They are obliged to enforce the
warrant, and they are told to do so by all reasonable means, which includes the duties of either
arresting or seeking an arrest warrant should the arrest be impractical. There is nothing
mysterious or “unconventional” about the entitlement.
Justice Souter also argues that when property rights have been recognized by the Court,
there has always been a clear distinction between the right and the procedural obligations
required to protect the right.121 If this is all that is required, then contrary to Justice Souter’s
opinion, Ms. Gonzales’s claims satisfy the requirement. If what is required is that the procedure
be separate from the right in question, there is no doubt that the procedure for determining if
there is probable cause to either arrest or seek an arrest warrant is separate from either arresting
or seeking an arrest warrant.
121

Id. at 2812.
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The circuit court in this case identified three simple and discrete steps in the process that
it held was due to Ms. Gonzales. These were identified in the statute and they were distinct from
the entitlement the process was designed to provide for those whose claim to the entitlement had
merit. As the circuit court stated,
The statute… guides officers as to the process they should provide a holder of a
restraining order before depriving that individual of his or her enforcement rights. The
statute directs police officers to determine whether a valid order exists, [FN17] whether
probable cause exists that the restrained party is violating the order, see Colo.Rev.Stat. §
18-6-803.5(3)(b)(I), and whether probable cause exists that the restrained party has
notice of the order. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b)(II). [FN18] If, after
completing these three basic steps, an officer finds the restraining order does not qualify
for mandatory enforcement, the person claiming the right should be notified of the
officer's decision and the reason for it.122
This rather simple and straight forward process arguably is what is due under the due
process clause of the U.S. Constitution.123 It is completely separate from that which the process
is meant to deliver. It is meant to deliver a non-arbitrary decision as to whether Ms. Gonzales’s
right to the enforcement of the restraining order has merit and will be carried out or denied.

3) The statute serves both public and private ends and the history of the legislation and
other similar legislation indicates that that the intention was to create a right or
entitlement in the mandatory enforcement

At first glance, the Court’s third set of arguments appears to be the most compelling. We
are very comfortable with the distinction between criminal law and civil law, with the former
122

Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1116. Notes 17 and 18 state:
[17] This task can be accomplished by either examining the order in person, or by checking to see
if the order has been entered in the statewide registry of protective orders. See COLO.REV.STAT. §
18-6- 803.7 (creating central registry of protective orders issued in Colorado).
[18] In making these determinations, the statute states "a peace officer shall assume that the
information received from the registry is accurate. A peace officer shall enforce a valid restraining
order whether or not there is a record of the restraining order in the registry." COLO.REV.STAT. §
18-6-803.5(3)(c).

Id.
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This appears to be a good minimal place to start, given that the process is laid out in the statute. It does not
follow, however, that this is a sufficient process, particularly when the result is a refusal to enforce the order.
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serving public ends and the latter serving private ends.124 As the majority states, "serving of
public rather than private ends is the normal course of the criminal law."125 Thus, it is plausible
to contend that a statute placing duties on the police to enforce the law are designed to serve
public ends, rather than private ends.126 However, the two are not mutually exclusive. There is
no question that the Colorado statute was designed to serve public ends. It does not follow,
however, that it was not also designed to serve private ends, or even that it helped to serve the
public end by giving a private entitlement.127
The Court’s argument would be more compelling if the Colorado statute provided a
general mandate to enforce all laws diligently and without undue delay. It becomes much less
plausible when one thinks of the mischief the legislation was designed to correct. The legislation
was designed to protect the shocking numbers of women and children harmed in the domestic
context. It aimed to protect this class of persons by correcting two problems in the approach to
domestic violence: 1) the ineffectiveness of counseling and mediation in these cases and 2)
police indifference or inaction in these cases. It did so by both shifting intervention in this area
from mediation and counseling to arrests, and by making enforcement of restraining orders
mandatory.128 As noted above, the Colorado legislation was not created in isolation, but in
accord with a trend across the country to create mandatory enforcement laws for domestic
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Justice Scalia reaches back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to support this view. Id. at 2808 (citing 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1769) and Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668
(1892)).
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Id. at 2808.
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Although not recognized by Justice Scalia, his argument is superficially bolstered by Colorado Revised Statutes
section 2-4-201(e) (Intentions in the enactment of statutes), which states “(1) In enacting a statute, it is presumed
that:… (e) Public interest is favored over any private interest.” This in no way defeats the private interest when it is
compatable with the public interest. Further, “Where the meaning is clear and no injustice would result, the statute
must be interpreted as written without resort to other rules of statutory construction.” In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d
27, 29 (Colo. 1989) (citing People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986)).
127
Both our common law and statutory law regularly serve public ends by providing private rights of action.
Punitive damages is the clearest common law example while the § 1983 legislation provides a right to sue for “the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
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See Wanless, supra note 5.
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violence and restraining order violations. It has been the victims and/or survivors and their
advocacy groups that have pushed for these rights and duties.129 As Kristian Miccio points out:
In some jurisdictions, such as Colorado, advocates were approached by key
legislators to incorporate mandatory state intervention into arrest provisions. This
was the culmination of years of working within the law enforcement
establishment as advocates attempted to change police practices through the
institution of pro-arrest policies as the preferred course of action.130
Finally, given that advocacy groups were involved in the drafting of the legislation, it is a stretch
to think that the drafters of the legislation were not aware of the Oregon legislation and the
Nearing case holding that the provisions of the legislation did give rise to an entitlement to
enforcement on the part of the plaintiff in that case.131
4)

Because the entitlement was created by the democratically elected and accountable
representatives of the people of Colorado, because it does have monetary value, and
because it is central to the purpose of the legislation, it is inappropriate for the Supreme
Court to unilaterally diminish this entitlement to something unworthy of due process
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment

The majority of the Court still would not refer to this as a property interest under the due
process clause, as it does not believe it resembles traditional conceptions of property,132 it does
not have monetary value and according to the Court, “the alleged property interest here arises
incidentally, not out of some new species of government benefit or service, but out of a function
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Kristian Miccio traces the histories of both the battered women’s movement as well as the mandatory arrest
movement in A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence and the Conservatization of the Battered
Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 248-264, 264-282 (2005). See also Wanless, supra note 5 at 539-540.
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Id. at 279 (n. 175 omitted) (referring to her interviews with advocates in Colorado in 2003).
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The plaintiff in Nearing sued under the Oregon Tort Claims Act. As the court held, “If a private defendant would
be liable for harm caused by failure to carry out a mandatory duty for the benefit of a specific person protected by a
court order,… the Tort Claims Act makes a public defendant liable in the same manner.” Nearing, 670 P.2d at 144.
As noted, this case was brought under § 1983 based on the alleged due process violation of the state entitlement. It
also may have been brought under Colorado state law; Colorado Revised Statutes section 24-10-118 allows for suits
against public employees for injuries caused by willful and wanton conduct. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (LEXIS
through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)). The facts alleged arguably satisfy the requirement.
132
He acknowledges that this is no bar to the claim. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
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that government actors have always performed -- to wit, arresting people who they have probable
cause to believe have committed a criminal offense.”133
This last set of arguments is perhaps the least convincing of all. Roth changed the focus
from traditional wooden and naive notions of property to a view of property rights and
entitlement that looked to the function of property. By looking at the function of property from
the past to the present, the Court was able to formulate the rule that, “It is a purpose of the
ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.”134
On the one hand, the Court wants to paint the entitlement in question as something
“novel,” that “cannot ‘simply go without saying.’”135 It is not traditional. On the other hand, it
wants to say that it is incidental to something that has been happening all along, namely
“arresting people.”136 Unfortunately the Court has it backwards. Entitlements to mandatory
arrest for the violation of restraining orders are not novel; they have been around since 1977 –
nearly thirty years—and the Oregon statute was interpreted to create a new property-like
entitlement in 1983, over twenty years ago. However, what has not been happening “all along”
is police enforcement of restraining orders. If the police had in fact been arresting people all
along for these violations there would not have been a need for (what is now) a majority of the
states in the U.S. to pass legislation mandating arrest for the violation of restraining orders. It is
precisely a “new species of government benefit or service” that was created by the legislation,
rather than an incidental benefit gained by a general mandate of the police to enforce the law.
That benefit was further narrowed to the specific protected person named in the restraining order
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issued by the court. As Justice Stevens states, “A concern for the "'protected person'" pervades
the statute.”137

The assertion that a right to the mandatory enforcement of the restraining order had no
monetary value is an odd claim in today’s world where private security companies, private
investigators, and bounty hunters routinely conduct police functions for money.138 The argument
against Justice Steven’s claim that one could have a contract for such services furthers the point
that the order had monetary value rather than detracting from the point. Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, responded in a note that:

Respondent probably could have hired a private firm to guard her house, to
prevent her husband from coming onto the property, and perhaps even to search
for her husband after she discovered that her children were missing. Her alleged
entitlement here, however, does not consist in an abstract right to "protection," but
(according to the dissent) in enforcement of her restraining order through the
arrest of her husband, or the seeking of a warrant for his arrest, after she gave the
police probable cause to believe the restraining order had been violated. A private
person would not have the power to arrest under those circumstances because the
crime would not have occurred in his presence. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-201
(Lexis 1999). And, needless to say, a private person would not have the power to
obtain an arrest warrant.139
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Id. at 2821 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
One wonders if Justice Scalia and the rest of the majority think that the protection given by the U.S. Marshals to
members of the judiciary is without monetary value. The U.S. Marshals website boasts that it “coordinated and
provided 187 instances of personal protective services to U.S. Supreme Court justices” in 2004.
Http://www.usmarshals.gov/judicial/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2005). The federal judiciary has in fact been mobilizing
for better protection since the killing of the family members of Justice Lefkow in February of this year. See U.S.
Marshals Service Resources Faulted by Federal Judiciary, 37(5) THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS (May 2005); Judges Plead for Improved Judicial Security 37(6) THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS (Jun. 2005). It has resulted in the proposed Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection
Act of 2005. H.R. 1751. Although I do not wish to diminish the problem here, The ABA Justice Center
Coordinating Council, Judicial Division, Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements, Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence, in its REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES states, “In the federal
court system, for example, three federal judges have been killed in the past 25 years. It is believed that previously
no family members had ever been killed.” Available at:
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2005/annual/summaryofrecommendations/106C.doc (last visited Aug. 15, 2005).
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First, a private person would have had the power to arrest since the continued abduction of the
children was a continuing breach of the terms of the restraining order.140 Secondly, it does not
follow that there is no monetary value that can be placed on the enforcement of the order simply
because a private person does not have the power to obtain an arrest warrant.141 It means that the
entitlement given is worth more than what one can buy in the market. In the present case, it
would not necessarily have been worth much more since a citizen’s arrest could have been made.
In those cases in which a citizen’s arrest cannot be made, due to the fact that the violation of the
order is not ongoing, the warrant is worth considerably more since it puts more resources
towards fulfillment of the requirement and substantially increases protection and the likelihood
of an arrest.

IV

CONCLUSION: ANOTHER CASE IN LOCHNER’S LEGACY

The Court ends its opinion by stating that:
In light of today's decision and that in DeShaney, the benefit that a third party
may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not
trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in
its "substantive" manifestations. This result reflects our continuing reluctance to
treat the Fourteenth Amendment as "'a font of tort law,'" Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 544, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) (quoting Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S., at 701, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155), but it does not mean States
are powerless to provide victims with personally enforceable remedies. Although
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17
Stat. 13 (the original source of § 1983), did not create a system by which police
departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better
policing might have prevented, the people of Colorado are free to craft such a
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The restraining order required that the husband not "molest or disturb" the peace of Ms. Gonzales and the
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Criminal Justice Servs. & N.Y. State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, Family Protection and
Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994: Evaluation of the Mandatory Arrest Provisions, Final Report to the
Governor and Legislature 2 (2001)).

37

system under state law. Cf. DeShaney, 489 U.S., at 203, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249, 109
S. Ct. 998. n15.
This appears to say that states cannot create property rights or entitlements in the mandatory
enforcement of restraining orders that are worthy of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
protection. It seems to say that states can only make state enforceable rights of this nature. It
tells the people that have fought for those rights, which are central to the protection of life,
liberty and property, that they are not worthy of even procedural due process protection. The last
statement regarding what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1871 did or did not create completely mischaracterizes the law. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment wrote in plain language, “…nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” Likewise § 1983’s plain language states,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…
Thus, it is irrelevant that the framers of these two provisions did not “create a system by which
police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better policing
might have prevented.”142 They created a mechanism for holding accountable those acting under
color of state authority for the deprivation of a right or privilege, namely, in this context the right
to simple due process. The due process right attaches to the right or entitlement to property. At
the beginning of its opinion the Court stated, “Such entitlements are "'of course, . . . not created
by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
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understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.'"143 Thus, while the
majority begins its judgment with the view that it is for states to determine the rights that are to
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, by the end of the judgment it takes that
determination into its own hands and decides that an entitlement to a mandatory arrest is not
good enough to be counted as a property right and afforded Fourteenth Amendment protection.
The Castle Rock decision has the ring of Justice Peckham’s in Lochner just over one
hundred years ago.144 Justice Peckham and a majority of the court decided that it was for them
to decide what the Fourteenth Amendment meant by liberty, striking down a New York statute
designed to limit the working hours of bakers in New York to under sixty a week for the
workers’ health and safety.145 Peckham and his Court chose the liberty of employers to exploit
their workers over the health and safety of workers, contrary to the views of the legislature.146
Today, Justice Scalia and the majority of the Court have taken it upon themselves to decide what
the Fourteenth Amendment means by property, by rewriting a statute designed to make
enforcement of restraining orders mandatory for the health and welfare of “protected persons.”
The Court has chosen the liberty of police officers to ignore their duties to enforce court ordered
restraining orders over the safety and security of the victims of domestic violence.
Holmes said of the Lochner decision, “This case is decided upon an economic theory
which a large part of the country does not entertain.”147 The same is true of the view of

143

125 S. Ct. at 2803 (citations omitted).
Justice Scalia has invoked Lochner to criticize the majority of the Court in College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He has also been criticized
for his “Lochner-izing.” See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Takings Term II: New Tools for Attacking and Defending
Environmental and Land-Use Regulation, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 469, 471 (1993).
145
The problem addressed by the legislature was the white lung problem, which caused substantial health issues for
bakers who were working very long hours.
146
“It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail -- the power of the State to legislate or the right of
the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in
a remote degree to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid.” Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
147
Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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“discretionary” enforcement of restraining orders that grounds this decision.148 The Supreme
Court may not like the fact that Colorado attempted to create a right that the police enforce such
orders, since it imposes a duty for the police to actually do something, a positive entitlement,
rather than a mere negative right. But was it for the Court to second guess the Colorado’s
creation of the right? Again the Court may have benefited from Justice Holmes, who stated,
… I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that
state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as
legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this…Some of
these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share.
Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State
or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.149
Although the common view of Lochner is that it was the decision of an activist court,150 Cass
Sunstein has characterized the Court as holding the view that neutrality was constitutionally
required.151 However, its approach to “neutrality” was problematic at best.152 Sunstein has
described the Lochner Court’s approach to “neutrality” as embracing three key concepts:
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This is evidenced by the fact that more than fifty percent of states have passed mandatory arrest statutes for the
violation of protection order.
149
Id. The Court here effectively struck down the Colorado mandatory arrest provisions for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause by holding that Colorado’s notion of a property right conflicts with the
Supreme Court’s conception of a property right.
150
Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUMBIA L. REV. 873, 874 n.6 (1987) (referring to J. CHOPER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982)).
151
Id. at 874.
152
As Sunstein states, “The purpose of this Article is to suggest that the case should be taken to symbolize not
merely an aggressive judicial role, but an approach that imposes a constitutional requirement of neutrality, and
understands the term to refer to preservation of the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements under the
baseline of the common law. Thus understood, Lochner has hardly been overruled.” Id. at 875.
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“government inaction, the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements, and the baseline set
by the common law.”153 As he stated:
Governmental intervention was constitutionally troublesome, whereas inaction
was not; and both neutrality and inaction were defined as respect for the behavior
of private actors pursuant to the common law, in light of the existing distribution
of wealth and entitlements. Whether there was a departure from the requirement
of neutrality, in short, depended on whether the government had altered the
common law distribution of entitlements. Market ordering under the common law
was understood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct, and it formed
the baseline from which to measure the constitutionally critical lines that
distinguished action from inaction and neutrality from impermissible
partisanship.154
It is not a stretch to place the Colorado legislation under this scheme. One need only substitute
“police discretion” for “market ordering” and the rest follows. Colorado attempted to change the
existing distribution of entitlements by altering the “natural” common law public duty rule
through legislation that imposed a special relationship on the police and persons holding
restraining order. It attempted to impose specific duties where there were none, and create rights
that had not previously existed. This move by the Colorado legislature, which was endorsed by
the Tenth Circuit, was seen as ‘activist’ by the U.S. Supreme Court.155
The attempt by Colorado to create an entitlement to the enforcement of protection orders
is no more activist than the attempt by New York to limit the working hours of bakers. The need
for the legislation in this case was no less pressing than that in Lochner. In this case, as in the
case of Lochner, the common law status quo was not capable of correcting the systemic problem.
New York workers did not have leverage in the market to negotiate safer conditions and more
reasonable hours, so the legislature stepped in. In Colorado, attempts by victim advocacy groups

153
154

Id. at 874.
Id.
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to get the police to change from within had failed, and so once again, the legislature stepped in to
correct the problem. In both cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has undermined these efforts.
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APPENDIX A
Legislation pertaining to arrests for the violation of restraining orders or protection orders
State
Alabamai
Alaskaii
Arizonaiii
Arkansasiv
Californiav
Coloradovi
Connecticut
Delawarevii
District of
Columbia
Floridaviii
Georgia
Hawaii
Idahoix
Illinoisx
Indianaxi
Iowaxii
Kansasxiii
Kentuckyxiv
Louisianaxv
Mainexvi
Marylandxvii
Massachusettsxviii
Michiganxix
Minnesotaxx
Mississippixxi
Missourixxii
Montanaxxiii
Nebraskaxxiv
Nevadaxxv
New Hampshire
New Jerseyxxvi
New Mexicoxxvii
New Yorkxxviii
North Carolinaxxix
North Dakotaxxx
Ohioxxxi

May Arrest
•

Shall Arrest

No Legislation on Point

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Oklahomaxxxii
Oregonxxxiii
Pennsylvaniaxxxiv
Puerto Ricoxxxv
Rhode Islandxxxvi
South Carolinaxxxvii
South Dakotaxxxviii
Tennesseexxxix
Texasxl
Utahxli
Vermontxlii
Virgin Islandsxliii
Virginiaxliv
Washingtonxlv
West Virginiaxlvi
Wisconsinxlvii
Wyomingxlviii
TOTAL

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

13

•
•
•
•
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i

ALA. CODE § 30-5A-4 (Michie, LEXIS through 2004 1st Special Sess.) (may arrest).
ALASKA. STAT. § 18.65.530(a) (LEXIS through 2004 legislation) (With or without a warrant, shall arrest).
iii
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602(M) (LEXIS through 2004 legislation) (with or without a warrant, may arrest).
iv
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-134(c)(1) (LEXIS through 2005 Reg. Sess.) (May arrest and take into custody without a
warrant).
v
CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(d) (Deering, LEXIS, includes all urgency legislation through 7/27/05) (may arrest).
vi
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-308.5(3)(B) (LEXIS through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)) (Shall arrest or if an
arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest). See id. at § 13-14-103(11)
(Duties of police officer enforcing orders…shall be in accordance with § 18-6-303.5 and any rules adopted by
Colorado supreme court).
vii
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 1046 (c) (LEXIS through 75 Del Laws, Ch 60) (Shall arrest with or without a warrant).
viii
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15 (WESTLAW through Chapter 352 and H.J.R. No. 1723, H.J.R. 1177 and S.J.R. No.
2144 (End) of the 2005 First Regular Session of the Nineteenth Legislature) (may arrest a person without a warrant).
ix
IDAHO CODE § 39-6312(2) (LEXIS through 2005 Sess.) (“May arrest without a warrant and take into custody”).
x
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/112A-26(a) (LEXIS through Pub. Act 94-69) (“May make an arrest without warrant”).
xi
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-1-15 (Michie, LEXIS through 2004 Reg. Sess.) (“The attachment for contempt shall be
immediately served by arresting the party charged, and bringing the party into court, if in session, to be dealt with as
in other cases of contempt. The court shall also take all necessary measures to secure and indemnify the plaintiff
against damages in the premises”).
xii
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.11 (LEXIS through 2005 Edition (2004 legis.)) (“Shall use every reasonable means to
enforce an order . . . if unable to take the person into custody within twenty-four hours . . . shall either request a
magistrate to make a determination as to whether a rule to show cause or arrest warrant should be issued, or refer the
matter to the county attorney”).
xiii
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307(a)-(b)(1) (LEXIS through 2004 Supp.) (“(a) All law enforcement agencies shall
adopt written policies regarding domestic violence calls . . . (b) such written policies shall include (1) a statement
directing that officers shall make an arrest when they have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed or
has been committed”).
xiv
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(2) (LEXIS through 2004 Extraordinary Sess.) (“Shall arrest without a warrant”).
xv
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79(E) (WESTLAW through all 2004 First Extraordinary and Reg. Sess. Acts) (“Shall
use every reasonable means, including but not limited to immediate arrest”).
ii
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xvi

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4012(5) (WESTLAW 2005 First Reg. Sess. of the 122nd Legis. &
with Emergency Legislation through the 2005 First Special Sess. of the
122nd Legis.) (“Shall arrest and take into custody”).
xvii
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509(b) (LEXIS through 2004 Reg. & Special Sess., with changes) (“Shall arrest
with or without a warrant and take into custody”).
xviii
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (WESTLAW through Ch. 71 of the 2005 1st Annual Sess.) (“Shall
arrest any person”).
xix
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764. 15b(1) (WESTLAW through P.A. 2005, No. 1-103) (“Without a warrant, may
arrest”).
xx
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (14)(e) (WESTLAW through laws of the 2005 Reg. Sess. effective through June 1,
2005) (‘Shall arrest without a warrant”).
xxi
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3)(a) (LEXIS through 2004 Reg. Sess.) (“Shall arrest without or without a warrant”).
xxii
MO. REV. STAT. § 455.085(2) (LEXIS through all 2004 legislation) (“Shall arrest”).
xxiii
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-6-210, 46-6-311 (LEXIS through all 2003 legislation. No legislation enacted in 2004)
(“May arrest a person when the officer has a warrant; (1) may arrest a person when a warrant has not been issued . . .
(2) Arrest is the preferred response). See id. at § 46-6-601. (“When a peace officer is called to the scene of a
reported incident of domestic violence but does not make an arrest, the peace officer shall file a written report with
the officer commanding the law enforcement agency employing the peace officer, setting forth the reason or reasons
for the decision.”).
xxiv
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-928 (LEXIS through 2004 2d Sess.) (“Shall with or without a warrant arrest”). See id. §
28-311.09(9) (“may with or without a warrant arrest”).
xxv
NEV. REV. STAT. 33.070(1) (LEXIS through 21st Special Sess. (2004)) (“Every . . . order must include a
provision ordering any law enforcement officer to arrest . . . with or without a warrant”).
xxvi
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:25-21(a)(3) (LEXIS through the 211th Legis. 2d Ann. Sess. (2005), through P.L. 2005 Ch.
114) (“Shall arrest”).
xxvii
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(C) (Michie 2005) (“Shall arrest without a warrant and take into custody”).
xxviii
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(b) (Consol., LEXIS through Ch. 185, 07/12/2005, with the exception of
Chs. 1-3, 105, 149, 150 & 161) (‘Shall arrest and shall not attempt to reconcile or mediate”).
xxix
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4.1(b) (LEXIS through all 2004 legislation) (“Shall arrest and take into custody without
a warrant or other process”).
xxx
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-11(1) (LEXIS through 2003 Sess. No legislation enacted in 2004) (“Shall arrest”).
See id. § 14-07.1-11(2) (“may arrest a person without a warrant if the arrest is made within twelve hours from the
time the officer determines there is probable cause to arrest for an assault of a family or household member as
defined in section 14-07.1-01, whether or not the assault took place in the presence of the officer. After twelve hours
has elapsed, the officer must secure an arrest warrant before making an arrest” (requires physical injury)).
xxxi
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(A)(1) (Anderson, LEXIS through legislation passed by the 126th General
Assembly and filed with the Sec. of State through Jun. 29, 2005) (“Shall arrest and detain, until a warrant can be
obtained”).
xxxii
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 196(7)(WESTLAW through chs. of the first 2005 First Reg. Sess. effective
through Jul. 1, 2005) (“May, without a warrant, arrest”).
xxxiii
OR. REV. STAT § 133.310(3) (LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess. Of 72nd Legis. Assembly) (“Shall arrest and take
into custody”).
xxxiv
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(a) (LEXIS through Act 2 of 2005 Legis. Sess.) (“Shall arrest”).
xxxv
8 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 628 (LEXIS through Dec. 2002) (“Shall proceed to make an arrest even if there were no
warrant to such effect”).
xxxvi
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(b)(1)(iv), (b)(4) (LEXIS through Jan. 2004 Sess.) (“Shall arrest . . . (4) If an arrest
without warrant cannot be made . . . shall advise victim of the right to file a criminal complaint and shall seek a
warrant for arrest if there is probable cause to do so.” (if within twenty-four hours)).
xxxvii
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70(B) (LEXIS through all legislation enacted in 2004) (“must arrest, with or without a
warrant” (if physical injury manifest)). See id. § 16-25-70(B) (“may arrest, with or without a warrant”).
xxxviii
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(1) (LEXIS through all 2005 legislation) (‘Shall arrest and take into
custody”).
xxxix
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a)(2) (LEXIS through 2004 Sess.) (“Shall arrest without a warrant”).
xl
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03(a)(3) (LEXIS through 2003 legislation. No legislation enacted in 2004.)
The provision states:
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May arrest, without warrant… (3) persons who the peace officer has probable cause to believe
have committed an offense defined by Section 25.07, Penal Code (violation of Protective Order),
or by Section 38.112, Penal Code (violation of Protective Order issued on basis of sexual assault),
if the offense is not committed in the presence of the peace officer; or
NOTICE: SECOND OF TWO VERSIONS OF SUBD. (a)(3)
As amended by Acts 2003, ch. 460, § 2 and ch. 1164, § 2
(3) persons who the peace officer has probable cause to believe have committed the offense
defined by Section 25.07, Penal Code (violation of Protective Order), if the offense is not
committed in the presence of the peace officer
xli
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.4(1) (WESTLAW through 2005 1st Special Sess.) (“Shall without a warrant, arrest”).
See id. § 30-6-8(1)(a) (WESTLAW through 2005 1st Special Sess.) (“Shall use every reasonable means to enforce
the court’s order”).
xlii
VT. R. CRIM. P. RULE 3 (LEXIS through Apr. 4, 2005) (“May arrest the person without a warrant”).
xliii
16 V.I. CODE ANN. § 94 (WESTLAW through Acts 6644 through 6725 of the 2004 Reg. Sess.) (“Shall make an
arrest without a warrant”).
xliv
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(A) (LEXIS through 2005 Reg. Sess., Acts 2005, cc. 1 to 951) (“May arrest without a
warrant”).
xlv
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(2) (WESTLAW through 2005 legislation effective through July 1, 2005)
(“Shall arrest without a warrant and take into custody”). See id. § 10.31.100(2)(a) (“Shall arrest and take into
custody”).
xlvi
W. VA. CODE § 48-27-1001(a) (LEXIS through 3d Ex. Sess.) (“Shall immediately arrest”). See id. § 48-271001(b) (“may arrest”).
xlvii
WIS. STAT. § 813.12(7)(b) (LEXIS through Mar. 11, 2005 (Act 2)) (“Shall arrest and take a person into
custody”).
xlviii
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-104(b) (LEXIS through 2005 Reg. Sess.) (“An order of protection issued under this
section shall contain a notice that willful violation of any provision of the order constitutes a crime as defined by
W.S. 6-4-404, can result in immediate arrest and may result in further punishment”).
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